| Taiwan
– Future Destroyer
Rewritten – October 2001 HOT NEWS: October
2001, November 01
Program Status: Planned – likely.
Operational Requirement: The Republic of
China Navy (ROCN) has a requirement for a modern force of surface
combatants to provide area air defense (AAW) for ROCN surface ships
and merchant shipping; and to serve as the flagship for ROCN surface
action groups. The ROCN currently lacks any major surface combatants
that are capable of handling saturation anti-ship missile attacks
launched by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) air, surface, and
subsurface platforms.
Program Background: Taiwan
began a program to acquire an area air defense capability in the
late 1980s, and in the early/mid-1990s the ROCN was on the verge of
constructing an anti-air warfare (AAW) frigate under the auspices of
the Advanced Combat System (ACS) Program. The ACS was basically an
open-systems-architecture, fully-distributed and COTS-based,
integrated combat management system coupled to an ADAR-2N
phased-array radar. (The ADAR-2N concept was developed by Lockheed
Martin and formed the basis for the current AN/SPY-1F phased-array
radar.) The ROCN planned to install the ACS in a stretched version
of the Cheng Kung/Kwang Hua 1 (PFG-2/modified Perry)
class design, which would displace around 5,000 tons. The ROCN
reportedly planned to acquire as many as six ACS ships as the second
flight of Cheng Kung/Kwang Hua 1 class Frigate Program
(following six Flight 1 ships built somewhat more closely to the
original US Perry class design).
The ACS ship would have been armed with up to 48
Standard SM-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and vertical launch
anti-submarine rockets (ASROCs) in a Mk-41 Vertical Launch System (VLS),
eight Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) Hsiung
Cheng 2 surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), up to sixteen
point-defense missiles (probably NATO Sea Sparrow), a 127mm main gun
and up to two Phalanx Close-In-Weapon Systems (CIWS). Lockheed
Martin eventually won the competition to design and produce the ACS,
and was supported in the ship design and integration work by Gibbs
and Cox, Inc. In 1994, the ACS Program was "indefinitely
deferred" for the following reasons:
· The high level of technological risk,
given the amount of system integration work required.
· Excessive cost, resulting from the
fact that most major systems had to be developed from scratch.
· Changing budgetary priorities.
· Internal political issues and
personnel changes.
· The belief that the ACS ship was
"over-packaged" for the limited Perry class hull.
Since the deferment of the ACS Program in 1994,
Taiwan has been pursuing the procurement of four Arleigh Burke
class destroyers form the US. Frequent press reports and industry
rumors continue to report Taiwan’s desire for up to four of the
vessels. Yearly reviews of Taiwan’s defense requirements generally
involve consideration of the Aegis System. However, the end result
has generally been deferment due to the fact it is a highly
political issue with the Chinese. As an alternative in 2001, the US
Government made the offer of four Kidd class destroyers to
Taiwan. Decommissioned in the 1990s with half of their useful lives
remaining, the four Kidd class were initially offered to
Australia and Greece under lease/sale programs in 1999 and early
2000. However, both nations have turned down the offer, making the Kidd
class available to the ROCN as an alternative to the Arleigh
Burke class destroyers. The ROCN leadership, however, is very
reluctant to apply the term "alternative" to the
Kidd-class ships, out of concern that doing so may be interpreted
(by the U.S., as well as Taiwan's government leadership) as its
tacit agreement not to further pursue the purchase of Aegis
combatants. Instead, supporters of the proposed Kidd-class program
have been trying to portray the ships as an "interim
solution" that can provide both greatly improved area AAW
capability for the fleet (through the New Threat Upgrade (NTU) and
SM-2 combination) and offer training and experience with 3-D radar
operations.
In April 2001, US President George Bush Jr.
offered the Taiwanese Government a weapons procurement package that
included up to eight conventionally-powered submarines and four Kidd
class destroyers. Again, Aegis was deferred. The Taiwanese
Government has not yet commented on the weapons package. However,
the ROCN is probably beginning to realize that its AAW requirement
is becoming more pronounced in the light of the PRC procurement of
up to four Sovremenny class destroyers with P-270 Moskit
(3M80/80E) (SS-N-22 Sunburn) surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). The
first two units have already been delivered.
Additionally, the seven Wu Chin III
destroyers that were commissioned in the 1940s as US Navy Gearing
class destroyers, need to be replaced as soon as possible. The Wu
Chin III class has minimal air defense capability, are too
costly to operate and is a drain on ROCN manpower. The ROCN will
probably procure the Kidd class since it is far superior to
the Wu Chin III class. The Kidd class will give Taiwan
its first area air defense capability, is less manpower intensive,
and considerably cheaper to operate, and could be available as early
as 2005. The Taiwanese Government and ROCN are starting to realize
that the Aegis system is extremely political, and may in fact be
many more years before its sale is approved, or worse yet, may not
be approved at all. If the sale was approved immediately, it would
be at least a decade before the ROCN would receive the first unit,
and the Navy does not have the luxury to wait. Additionally, it must
also be recognized that without the Aegis-equipped surface
combatants, Taiwan may also be foregoing its sea-based component of
the proposed theater ballistic missile/cruise missile defense (TBMD/CMD)
system, Options of additional land-based TBMD/CMD systems have been
offered to Taiwan.
Program Acquisition Plan: There
is no current acquisition plan for a new class of destroyer for the
ROCN. Although looking at options since March 1998, the ROCN has not
been able to successfully procure an air defense destroyer due to
its unique political situation. Although the ROCN has had a desire
to procure Aegis destroyers from the US since the mid-1990s, the
decision continues to be deferred by the US Government. There is
some opposition within the US on releasing Aegis to Taiwan due to
the sensitivity that it causes in the PRC.
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Kidd Class Destroyer in Bremerton
Shipyard
Since early 2001, the US Government has offered
the Taiwanese Government all four Kidd class destroyers for
around US$800M. In October 2001, the General Staff approved the
acquisition of the four Kidd class to fill its naval area air
defense needs to deal with the military buildup by the PRC. Recent
deliveries of two armed Sovremenny class destroyers to the
People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN), and continuing
construction of ballistic missile sites adjacent to Taiwan, are
adding to the sense of urgency in Taipei. By 2002, the Taiwanese
Government will probably approve the funding for the procurement of
all four Kidd class destroyers as an interim measure until a
new air defense platform can be procured at a later date. The
anticipated cost for the entire program (including SM-2 missiles is
approximately US$714M. It is expected that the Kidd class
will begin to replace Taiwan's 7 remaining modernized (WJ-3)
Gearing-class destroyers. The ROC Navy does not view the new (Aegis)
destroyers as replacements for the four Kidd-class ships,
since the latter (if bought) will almost certainly serve for many
years to come.
Now that the decision for the Kidd class
has been taken, and should the Aegis system not be approved, the
ROCN will must begin planning for future destroyer. A construction
contract should be anticipated by as early as 2007, with the first
unit entering service by 2012. As part of the conceptualization
process, the ROCN will continue to push for the releasability of the
Aegis System, as well as other options to eventually replace the Kidd
class. Based on this information, the following acquisition
plan, for a buy of four destroyers valued at an estimated US$1B
each, is projected:
-
Concept Start 2003
-
Concept Select 2004
-
Contract Design 2005
-
Construction Contract RfP 2006
-
Construction Contract Award 2007
-
First of Class Commissions 2012
-
Hull Two Commissions 2013
-
Hull Three Commissions 2014
-
Hull Four Commissions 2015
Design and Construction Considerations:
The ROCN has shown a keen interest in the US Navy's Arleigh
Burke (DDG-51) design, and continues to lobby for the
release of a combat system configuration that would be roughly on
par with the Arleigh Burke Flight 2 standards (AN/SPY-1D).
The US has not been willing to approve the export of such technology
to Taiwan, in part due to concerns about upsetting China --
particularly given the potential Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD)
implications of late-series Aegis Baseline 6 and 7 combat systems).
Other options for the future ROCN destroyer
include:
· Arleigh Burke design with a
hybrid combat system solution, loosely termed the Evolved Advanced
Combat System (E-ACS). E-ACS probably features a distributed,
open-systems-architecture employing COTS processors, and graphics
engines and displays. The AN/SPY-1F is probably the preferred
radar for the E-ACS. This design, as with the AN/SPY-1D, is
politically sensitive, and approval for transfer may or may not be
approved by the US Government.
· Arleigh Burke design with an
improved version of an air defense radar such as the ITT Gilfillan
AN/SPS-48E radar and other updated sensors, which are also on the Kidd
class. This option will be less politically sensitive, and
increase the likelihood of approval by the US Government.
· A European-designed hull built in the
US, incorporating either a modified version of the Aegis Combat
System or the E-ACS. The appeal of this option would be the lower
platform (hull construction) cost. At least one European shipyard,
in cooperation with U.S. contractors, has reportedly briefed the
ROC Navy on such a proposal, which is said to have consisted of at
least two different hull and combat system configurations.
· A new hull design built in the US or
Taiwan, possibly the Gibbs & Cox International Frigate
design. This new design will also probably incorporate improved
conventional radars and sensors, and have a good chance of
approval by the US Government.
· A European hull with European systems
is a possibility, although highly unlikely. Most European
countries have a one China policy, and will not approve major arms
purchase to Taiwan in order to maintain friendly political and
commercial relations with the PRC. France was the notable
exception in the early 1990s with the La Fayette class.
However, a major kick-back scandal that has placed significant
pressure on French companies and their doing business with Taiwan.
More than likely, the future ROCN destroyer will
be US-made. Due to political sensitivity, an Arleigh Burke
design with the AN/SPY-1D or AN/SPY-1F radar and Aegis combat
management system (CMS) will have a tough chance of being approved
by the US for the near term. A major shift in the balance of power
in Asia, or any belligerence by the PRC toward Taiwan, will increase
the likelihood of a future US sale. Barring the above two scenarios,
the future destroyer will probably be absent the AEGIS and SPY
systems.
The Bush Administration decision to put off a
decision on the Aegis destroyers should not be read as an indication
that the request, if again submitted by Taiwan in the future, would
not receive a more favorable decision. In fact, the ROC Navy is
believed to be continuing planning efforts related to the Aegis
destroyer requirement. Senior ROCN sources have privately indicated
that the Navy would not accept a solution that does not
incorporate the radar, (distributed architecture) combat system
baseline, and platform features of the latest Arleigh Burke-class
design, because the ships (even if approved next year) probably
would not enter service before about FY2010. The ROCN is, therefore,
seeking ways to continue dialogue with the U.S. on this project.
Possible options such as programming certain Arleigh Burke-class
units first as US Navy ships, so as to not cause a significant delay
in ultimate delivery schedule, are still being (quietly) considered.
The real variables (and challenges) affecting this endeavor,
however, are the evolving relationship between Washington and
Beijing (particularly in the aftermath of the September 2001
terrorist attacks and subsequent desire for counter-terrorism
alliance-building by the U.S.), as well as possible budgetary
limitations on the part of ROCN. The naval package approved by the
Bush Administration in April 2001 (consisting of 8 diesel-electric
submarines, 4 Kidd-class destroyers, and 12 P-3 ASW aircraft, plus
Sub-Harpoon missiles and Mk 48 Mod. 4 torpedoes) is estimated to
cost upwards of US$4 billion and will probably have to be spread
over a good number of years or through special legislation.
Ship Characteristics:
|
Vessel Type |
Destroyer (Guided Missile Destroyer) |
|
Country |
Taiwan |
|
Program |
Future Destroyer |
|
Total Number |
4 |
|
Unit Cost (US$) |
1B |
|
Builder |
Open. Most likely a US shipyard. |
|
Displ. Tons |
9,000 (full load) |
|
Length |
152m (498.6ft) (Est.) |
|
Beam |
20m (65.6ft) (Est.) |
|
Draft |
6.5m (21.3ft) (Est.) |
|
Machinery |
Gas Turbine: Open. Probably four General Electric LM 2500
gas turbines (105,000hp/78.33MW); two shafts; two controllable
pitch propellers. |
|
Speed (Knots) |
32 (Est.) |
|
Range |
4,400nm at 20kts (Est.). |
|
Complement |
300 (Est.) |
|
Weapons |
Guns: Open. Probably one United Defense LP 127mm/54 Mk 45
Mod 1 or 2 gun; two Raytheon Phalanx Close-In-Weapon System (CIWS).
Torpedoes: Open. Probably six 324mm Mk 32 Mod 14 (two
triple) tubes for the Raytheon Mk 46 Mod 5 lightweight
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) torpedoes. |
|
Missiles |
Surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs): Open. Probably Eight
Boeing Harpoon SSMs in two quad launchers.
Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs): Open. Probably two Lockheed
Martin Mk 41 Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) – 32 cells
forward and 32 aft for Raytheon Standard SM-2ER SAMs.
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapons: Vertical Launched
anti-submarine rockets (ASROC) (VLA). |
|
CMS/Fire Control |
Combat Management System (CMS): Open. |
|
Radar |
Air search/fire control: Open. Possibly Lockheed Martin
AN/SPY-1D phased array, or Lockheed Martin AN/SPY-1F.
Air search: As an alternative to the SPY-1D/F, the ITT
Gilfillan AN/SPS-48E.
Surface Search: Open. Probably the AN/SPS-67(V)3.
Navigation: Open. Probably the Raytheon AN/SPS-64(V)9.
Fire control: Open. Probably the Raytheon AN/SPG-62. |
|
Countermeasures |
Decoys: Two SRBOC six-barrelled Mk 36 Mod 12 chaff and IR
launchers; Northrop Grumman SLQ-25 Nixie torpedo decoy.
Electronic Support Measures (ESM)/Electronic
Countermeasures (ECM): Open. Probably the Raytheon
AN/SLQ-32(V)3/SLY-2. |
|
Sonar |
Open. Probably the Raytheon AN/SQQ-89(V)6 combining an
SQS-53C bow-mounted active search and attack sonar and an
AN/SQR-19B passive towed array (low frequency). |
|
Helicopter |
Flight deck and facilities to fuel and rearm a Sikorsky
SH-60B/F LAMPS III helicopter. |
Key Personnel:
- ·
Ministry of National Defense
Major General Chen Lan-Juen (as of 1 January 1999)
Director of Procurement
Military Procurement Bureau (MPB)
Ministry of National Defense
172-1 Po-Ai Road
Taipei, Taiwan
Tel: + 886 2 382 6078, 886 2 382 6079
Fax: + 886 2 383 6444
- ·
Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST)
Lieutenant General Liu Chin-Ling
President
Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST)
Lung Tan
Post Office Box 9008-1
Lungtan
Taiwan
Tel: + 886 3 471 2201
Fax: + 886 3 471 1057
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