Taiwan – Future Destroyer

Rewritten – October 2001 HOT NEWS: October 2001, November 01

Program Status: Planned – likely.

Operational Requirement: The Republic of China Navy (ROCN) has a requirement for a modern force of surface combatants to provide area air defense (AAW) for ROCN surface ships and merchant shipping; and to serve as the flagship for ROCN surface action groups. The ROCN currently lacks any major surface combatants that are capable of handling saturation anti-ship missile attacks launched by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) air, surface, and subsurface platforms.

Program Background: Taiwan began a program to acquire an area air defense capability in the late 1980s, and in the early/mid-1990s the ROCN was on the verge of constructing an anti-air warfare (AAW) frigate under the auspices of the Advanced Combat System (ACS) Program. The ACS was basically an open-systems-architecture, fully-distributed and COTS-based, integrated combat management system coupled to an ADAR-2N phased-array radar. (The ADAR-2N concept was developed by Lockheed Martin and formed the basis for the current AN/SPY-1F phased-array radar.) The ROCN planned to install the ACS in a stretched version of the Cheng Kung/Kwang Hua 1 (PFG-2/modified Perry) class design, which would displace around 5,000 tons. The ROCN reportedly planned to acquire as many as six ACS ships as the second flight of Cheng Kung/Kwang Hua 1 class Frigate Program (following six Flight 1 ships built somewhat more closely to the original US Perry class design).

The ACS ship would have been armed with up to 48 Standard SM-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and vertical launch anti-submarine rockets (ASROCs) in a Mk-41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), eight Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) Hsiung Cheng 2 surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), up to sixteen point-defense missiles (probably NATO Sea Sparrow), a 127mm main gun and up to two Phalanx Close-In-Weapon Systems (CIWS). Lockheed Martin eventually won the competition to design and produce the ACS, and was supported in the ship design and integration work by Gibbs and Cox, Inc. In 1994, the ACS Program was "indefinitely deferred" for the following reasons:

· The high level of technological risk, given the amount of system integration work required.

· Excessive cost, resulting from the fact that most major systems had to be developed from scratch.

· Changing budgetary priorities.

· Internal political issues and personnel changes.

· The belief that the ACS ship was "over-packaged" for the limited Perry class hull.

Since the deferment of the ACS Program in 1994, Taiwan has been pursuing the procurement of four Arleigh Burke class destroyers form the US. Frequent press reports and industry rumors continue to report Taiwan’s desire for up to four of the vessels. Yearly reviews of Taiwan’s defense requirements generally involve consideration of the Aegis System. However, the end result has generally been deferment due to the fact it is a highly political issue with the Chinese. As an alternative in 2001, the US Government made the offer of four Kidd class destroyers to Taiwan. Decommissioned in the 1990s with half of their useful lives remaining, the four Kidd class were initially offered to Australia and Greece under lease/sale programs in 1999 and early 2000. However, both nations have turned down the offer, making the Kidd class available to the ROCN as an alternative to the Arleigh Burke class destroyers. The ROCN leadership, however, is very reluctant to apply the term "alternative" to the Kidd-class ships, out of concern that doing so may be interpreted (by the U.S., as well as Taiwan's government leadership) as its tacit agreement not to further pursue the purchase of Aegis combatants. Instead, supporters of the proposed Kidd-class program have been trying to portray the ships as an "interim solution" that can provide both greatly improved area AAW capability for the fleet (through the New Threat Upgrade (NTU) and SM-2 combination) and offer training and experience with 3-D radar operations.

In April 2001, US President George Bush Jr. offered the Taiwanese Government a weapons procurement package that included up to eight conventionally-powered submarines and four Kidd class destroyers. Again, Aegis was deferred. The Taiwanese Government has not yet commented on the weapons package. However, the ROCN is probably beginning to realize that its AAW requirement is becoming more pronounced in the light of the PRC procurement of up to four Sovremenny class destroyers with P-270 Moskit (3M80/80E) (SS-N-22 Sunburn) surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). The first two units have already been delivered.

Additionally, the seven Wu Chin III destroyers that were commissioned in the 1940s as US Navy Gearing class destroyers, need to be replaced as soon as possible. The Wu Chin III class has minimal air defense capability, are too costly to operate and is a drain on ROCN manpower. The ROCN will probably procure the Kidd class since it is far superior to the Wu Chin III class. The Kidd class will give Taiwan its first area air defense capability, is less manpower intensive, and considerably cheaper to operate, and could be available as early as 2005. The Taiwanese Government and ROCN are starting to realize that the Aegis system is extremely political, and may in fact be many more years before its sale is approved, or worse yet, may not be approved at all. If the sale was approved immediately, it would be at least a decade before the ROCN would receive the first unit, and the Navy does not have the luxury to wait. Additionally, it must also be recognized that without the Aegis-equipped surface combatants, Taiwan may also be foregoing its sea-based component of the proposed theater ballistic missile/cruise missile defense (TBMD/CMD) system, Options of additional land-based TBMD/CMD systems have been offered to Taiwan.

Program Acquisition Plan: There is no current acquisition plan for a new class of destroyer for the ROCN. Although looking at options since March 1998, the ROCN has not been able to successfully procure an air defense destroyer due to its unique political situation. Although the ROCN has had a desire to procure Aegis destroyers from the US since the mid-1990s, the decision continues to be deferred by the US Government. There is some opposition within the US on releasing Aegis to Taiwan due to the sensitivity that it causes in the PRC.

ChandlerDDG996-Oberg.jpg (69610 bytes)
Kidd Class Destroyer in Bremerton Shipyard

Since early 2001, the US Government has offered the Taiwanese Government all four Kidd class destroyers for around US$800M. In October 2001, the General Staff approved the acquisition of the four Kidd class to fill its naval area air defense needs to deal with the military buildup by the PRC. Recent deliveries of two armed Sovremenny class destroyers to the People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN), and continuing construction of ballistic missile sites adjacent to Taiwan, are adding to the sense of urgency in Taipei. By 2002, the Taiwanese Government will probably approve the funding for the procurement of all four Kidd class destroyers as an interim measure until a new air defense platform can be procured at a later date. The anticipated cost for the entire program (including SM-2 missiles is approximately US$714M. It is expected that the Kidd class will begin to replace Taiwan's 7 remaining modernized (WJ-3) Gearing-class destroyers. The ROC Navy does not view the new (Aegis) destroyers as replacements for the four Kidd-class ships, since the latter (if bought) will almost certainly serve for many years to come.

Now that the decision for the Kidd class has been taken, and should the Aegis system not be approved, the ROCN will must begin planning for future destroyer. A construction contract should be anticipated by as early as 2007, with the first unit entering service by 2012. As part of the conceptualization process, the ROCN will continue to push for the releasability of the Aegis System, as well as other options to eventually replace the Kidd class. Based on this information, the following acquisition plan, for a buy of four destroyers valued at an estimated US$1B each, is projected:

  • Concept Start 2003

  • Concept Select 2004

  • Contract Design 2005

  • Construction Contract RfP 2006

  • Construction Contract Award 2007

  • First of Class Commissions 2012

  • Hull Two Commissions 2013

  • Hull Three Commissions 2014

  • Hull Four Commissions 2015

Design and Construction Considerations: The ROCN has shown a keen interest in the US Navy's Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) design, and continues to lobby for the release of a combat system configuration that would be roughly on par with the Arleigh Burke Flight 2 standards (AN/SPY-1D). The US has not been willing to approve the export of such technology to Taiwan, in part due to concerns about upsetting China -- particularly given the potential Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) implications of late-series Aegis Baseline 6 and 7 combat systems).

Other options for the future ROCN destroyer include:

· Arleigh Burke design with a hybrid combat system solution, loosely termed the Evolved Advanced Combat System (E-ACS). E-ACS probably features a distributed, open-systems-architecture employing COTS processors, and graphics engines and displays. The AN/SPY-1F is probably the preferred radar for the E-ACS. This design, as with the AN/SPY-1D, is politically sensitive, and approval for transfer may or may not be approved by the US Government.

· Arleigh Burke design with an improved version of an air defense radar such as the ITT Gilfillan AN/SPS-48E radar and other updated sensors, which are also on the Kidd class. This option will be less politically sensitive, and increase the likelihood of approval by the US Government.

· A European-designed hull built in the US, incorporating either a modified version of the Aegis Combat System or the E-ACS. The appeal of this option would be the lower platform (hull construction) cost. At least one European shipyard, in cooperation with U.S. contractors, has reportedly briefed the ROC Navy on such a proposal, which is said to have consisted of at least two different hull and combat system configurations.

· A new hull design built in the US or Taiwan, possibly the Gibbs & Cox International Frigate design. This new design will also probably incorporate improved conventional radars and sensors, and have a good chance of approval by the US Government.

· A European hull with European systems is a possibility, although highly unlikely. Most European countries have a one China policy, and will not approve major arms purchase to Taiwan in order to maintain friendly political and commercial relations with the PRC. France was the notable exception in the early 1990s with the La Fayette class. However, a major kick-back scandal that has placed significant pressure on French companies and their doing business with Taiwan.

More than likely, the future ROCN destroyer will be US-made. Due to political sensitivity, an Arleigh Burke design with the AN/SPY-1D or AN/SPY-1F radar and Aegis combat management system (CMS) will have a tough chance of being approved by the US for the near term. A major shift in the balance of power in Asia, or any belligerence by the PRC toward Taiwan, will increase the likelihood of a future US sale. Barring the above two scenarios, the future destroyer will probably be absent the AEGIS and SPY systems.

The Bush Administration decision to put off a decision on the Aegis destroyers should not be read as an indication that the request, if again submitted by Taiwan in the future, would not receive a more favorable decision. In fact, the ROC Navy is believed to be continuing planning efforts related to the Aegis destroyer requirement. Senior ROCN sources have privately indicated that the Navy would not accept a solution that does not incorporate the radar, (distributed architecture) combat system baseline, and platform features of the latest Arleigh Burke-class design, because the ships (even if approved next year) probably would not enter service before about FY2010. The ROCN is, therefore, seeking ways to continue dialogue with the U.S. on this project. Possible options such as programming certain Arleigh Burke-class units first as US Navy ships, so as to not cause a significant delay in ultimate delivery schedule, are still being (quietly) considered. The real variables (and challenges) affecting this endeavor, however, are the evolving relationship between Washington and Beijing (particularly in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent desire for counter-terrorism alliance-building by the U.S.), as well as possible budgetary limitations on the part of ROCN. The naval package approved by the Bush Administration in April 2001 (consisting of 8 diesel-electric submarines, 4 Kidd-class destroyers, and 12 P-3 ASW aircraft, plus Sub-Harpoon missiles and Mk 48 Mod. 4 torpedoes) is estimated to cost upwards of US$4 billion and will probably have to be spread over a good number of years or through special legislation.

Ship Characteristics:

Vessel Type

Destroyer (Guided Missile Destroyer)

Country

Taiwan

Program

Future Destroyer

Total Number

4

Unit Cost (US$)

1B

Builder

Open. Most likely a US shipyard.

Displ. Tons

9,000 (full load)

Length

152m (498.6ft) (Est.)

Beam

20m (65.6ft) (Est.)

Draft

6.5m (21.3ft) (Est.)

Machinery

Gas Turbine: Open. Probably four General Electric LM 2500 gas turbines (105,000hp/78.33MW); two shafts; two controllable pitch propellers.

Speed (Knots)

32 (Est.)

Range

4,400nm at 20kts (Est.).

Complement

300 (Est.)

Weapons

Guns: Open. Probably one United Defense LP 127mm/54 Mk 45 Mod 1 or 2 gun; two Raytheon Phalanx Close-In-Weapon System (CIWS).

Torpedoes: Open. Probably six 324mm Mk 32 Mod 14 (two triple) tubes for the Raytheon Mk 46 Mod 5 lightweight anti-submarine warfare (ASW) torpedoes.

Missiles

Surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs): Open. Probably Eight Boeing Harpoon SSMs in two quad launchers.

Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs): Open. Probably two Lockheed Martin Mk 41 Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) – 32 cells forward and 32 aft for Raytheon Standard SM-2ER SAMs.

Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapons: Vertical Launched anti-submarine rockets (ASROC) (VLA).

CMS/Fire Control

Combat Management System (CMS): Open.

Radar

Air search/fire control: Open. Possibly Lockheed Martin AN/SPY-1D phased array, or Lockheed Martin AN/SPY-1F.

Air search: As an alternative to the SPY-1D/F, the ITT Gilfillan AN/SPS-48E.

Surface Search: Open. Probably the AN/SPS-67(V)3.

Navigation: Open. Probably the Raytheon AN/SPS-64(V)9.

Fire control: Open. Probably the Raytheon AN/SPG-62.

Countermeasures

Decoys: Two SRBOC six-barrelled Mk 36 Mod 12 chaff and IR launchers; Northrop Grumman SLQ-25 Nixie torpedo decoy.

Electronic Support Measures (ESM)/Electronic Countermeasures (ECM): Open. Probably the Raytheon AN/SLQ-32(V)3/SLY-2.

Sonar

Open. Probably the Raytheon AN/SQQ-89(V)6 combining an SQS-53C bow-mounted active search and attack sonar and an AN/SQR-19B passive towed array (low frequency).

Helicopter

Flight deck and facilities to fuel and rearm a Sikorsky SH-60B/F LAMPS III helicopter.

Key Personnel:

· Ministry of National Defense
Major General Chen Lan-Juen (as of 1 January 1999)
Director of Procurement
Military Procurement Bureau (MPB)
Ministry of National Defense
172-1 Po-Ai Road
Taipei, Taiwan
Tel: + 886 2 382 6078, 886 2 382 6079
Fax: + 886 2 383 6444
· Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST)
Lieutenant General Liu Chin-Ling
President
Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST)
Lung Tan
Post Office Box 9008-1
Lungtan
Taiwan
Tel: + 886 3 471 2201
Fax: + 886 3 471 1057

 

 

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